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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates private military corporations 
(PMCs) to examine their effectiveness and efficiency as a 
substitute for traditional military forces. The PMC consists 
of a for profit firm that provides military services that 
range from combat operations to training, security and 
logistics support. While the PMCs represent a solution to 
issues such as insufficient military resources to provide 
direct support to other nations, there remain a number of 
political and structural barriers to their widespread use. 
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I. PRIVATE MILITARY CORPORATIONS 
A. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
Current military operations in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan have brought to light the strengths and 
weaknesses of the United States Armed Forces. Although the 
current military organization has advanced capabilities for 
carrying out armed combat, the organization is not large 
enough to support all of its ancillary needs. As a direct 
result of this situation, private military corporations or 
PMCs are becoming an important and integral part of military 
operations. While this arrangement provides the military 
with the critical support that it needs to ensure the 
effectiveness of core military operations, there are some 
questions about the efficacy and efficiency of these 
organizations. Specifically, operations at Halliburton’s KBR 
(Kellogg Brown and Root) division have come under recent 
fire over the costs of services charged to the U.S. 
government.1 
As the importance of private military organizations 
continues to increase and controversy over the cost and 
allocation of taxpayer funds intensifies, there is a direct 
impetus to examine whether or not private military 
organizations offer a clear advantage for improving military 
operations. Clearly, the current military operations taking 
place in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight the need for such 
services. However, in order to determine the impact of these 
services, issues of effectiveness and efficiency must be 
                     
1“The heat is on.” Economist, 371(8381), (2004): 66. 
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addressed. Using this as a basic foundation for 
investigation, the purpose of this research is to assess the 
context, scope and purpose of private military 
organizations. Through a review of these issues it will be 
possible to understand the effectiveness and efficiency of 
PMCs and to make critical recommendations about how these 
organizations should be utilized to support military 
operations. 
B. IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY 
A critical review of what has been noted about the 
importance of private military corporations demonstrates 
that these organizations are fast becoming an essential part 
of military operations.2 As noted by one scholar: “While 
change in our armed forces is long overdue, the greatest 
transformation is occurring outside the government, with the 
wholesale embrace of privatized military companies (PMCs), 
foreign and domestic. This seemingly pragmatic response to 
increasing commitments and decreasing personnel will have 
significant effects on U.S. and allied military 
operations.”3 Thus, as the need for U.S. military presence 
increases, and the number of enlisted volunteers decreases, 
the U.S. government will have no other option but to utilize 
the services of private military corporations. 
As the need for private military organizations 
increases, some controls and checks and balances will need 
to be instituted by the federal government to ensure that 
these organizations are providing the best possible service 
                     
2Paul Marx. “Private military companies: Handle with care.” 
Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, 131(2), (2005): 30. 
3Ibid. 
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while retaining a high degree of cost effectiveness. 
Unfortunately, at the present time, such controls have not 
been instituted. However, if private military organizations 
are to become a more prominent and integral part of the U.S. 
military, the U.S. government must have some measures in 
place to ensure that taxpayer money is utilized efficiently. 
In addition, guidelines for responsibilities and duties must 
be outlined such that the effectiveness of these 
organizations can be substantiated. 
When placed in this context, the importance of this 
issue becomes more apparent. The increasing role of private 
military corporations in the development of U.S. military 
operations must be monitored in order to ensure that these 
organizations are both effective and efficient. Thus, an 
investigation into the present state of private military 
corporations and their current effectiveness and 
efficiencies will provide a starting point for scholarly 
investigation into the development of these organizations. 
Without some consideration of these issues, the U.S. 
government and taxpayers will be unable to ensure the 
effectiveness and efficiency of these organizations in 
supporting military operations. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Introduction 
With the realization that the private military 
organizations will play such a dominant role in the 
development of military operations, some consideration of 
the background and purpose of these organizations must be 
taken into consideration. For this reason, it is important 
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to do a review of what has been written about private 
military organizations and their utility for modern military 
operations. In addition, some consideration of the 
effectiveness and efficiencies of these organizations must 
be taken into consideration. Effectiveness and efficiency 
must be defined, so that these variables can be applied to 
research on PMCs. 
2. Overview of Private Military Corporations 
Researchers examining the purpose and focus of private 
military corporations report that although this title has 
been given to a number of organizations, defining the 
operations of these organizations remains problematic.4 
Despite the challenges of creating a succinct definition for 
these organizations, scholars argue that in general terms, a 
private military organization is one which “provides 
international services traditionally provided by national 
militaries.”5 The range of services that can be provided in 
this context varies and can include any or all of the 
following: 
• Offensive combat operations (pulling triggers). 
• Armed security services in unstable states to 
private clients. 
                     
4Doug Brooks. “Messiahs or mercenaries? The future of international 
private military services. International Peacekeeping, 7(4), (2000): 
129.  Doug Brooks is the founder and President of the International 
Peace Operations Association; he is a specialist in African security 
issues and has written extensively on the regulation and constructive 
utilization of the private sector for international stabilization, 
peacekeeping, and humanitarian missions.  
5Ibid., 130. 
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• Armed security services in unstable states to 
public or international clients, including law and 
order operations. 
• Humanitarian protection, operations and support. 
• Military surveillance, strategic advice and 
intelligence. 
• Demining. 
• Military surveillance, strategic advice and 
intelligence. 
• Military and police training. 
• Logistics and supply for military operations.6 
Although some delineation with respect to the duties 
and actions taken by private military corporations can be 
outlined, scholars report that private military operations 
often involve other categories of service. In particular, 
the use of freelance mercenaries has been noted.7 “The term 
‘freelance mercenaries’ refers to private individual 
soldiers that offer military services on the open market to 
the highest bidder. Freelance mercenaries are very different 
from PMC/PSCs in terms of operations, clients, 
accountability and the capacity of the international 
community to regulate their activities.”8 Private 
mercenaries have an inverse relationship with PMCs, thriving 
in areas where reputable PMCs will not operate.9 
Despite the fact that modern mercenaries are viewed as 
the antithesis of the modern private military organization, 






research demonstrates that the origins of PMCs can be found 
in the actions of these individuals. “A common and 
appropriate starting point for the discussion of the state-
PMF (private military firm) relationship is the 
familiar…figure, the mercenary soldier—the person who fights 
for neither patriotism nor legal duty, but for economic 
gain.”10 Over the course of time, the lawless actions of the 
mercenaries were viewed by the state to be a threat to 
security. For this reason, mercenaries transformed into 
private military organizations, carrying out many of the 
same duties as mercenaries, but sanctioned by the state.11 
Not surprisingly, the presence of freelance mercenaries 
has promoted the evolution of a negative opinion of private 
military organizations.12 Despite this situation however, 
researchers report that in the 1990s, Western governments 
began publicly seeking the services of these organizations. 
Although the U.S. has utilized the services of PMCs since 
the Vietnam War, it was not until the early 1990s that the 
government actively disclosed the use of these organizations 
to the public.13 Thus, it has only been in the past twenty 
years that the public has become widely aware of the use of 
private organizations to support military operations.14 
                     
10Virginia Newell and Benedict Sheehy. “Corporate militaries and 
states: Actors, interactions and reactions.” Texas International Law 
Journal, 41(1), (2006): 69, 
http://libproxy.nps.edu:8080/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?di
d=1011270761&sid=5&Fmt=4&clientId=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD  [Accessed 15 
March 07]. 
11Ibid., 71. 
12Paul Jackson. “War is much too serious a thing to be left to 
military men: Private military companies, combat and regulation.” Civil 




Scholars examining the issues associated with private 
military organizations report that: 
As non-state actors, PMFs enjoy the rights and 
privileges of private actors, including: the 
privileges of free movements, relatively minor 
scrutiny of action, and the privacy accorded to 
citizens and the lack of accountability to the 
general public. […] These interactions between 
PMFs and states are generally carried out in 
private without the glare of international public 
scrutiny that typically surrounds decisions by 
states to expand, modernize or mobilize their 
military capacity.15 
What this effectively demonstrates is the integral 
relationship that develops between the private military 
organization and a contracting government. The nature, 
context and scope of this relationship would be subject to 
substantial public scrutiny based on the public’s awareness 
that these organizations are being utilized for assisting 
military operations. 
Arguably, the history and evolution of the private 
military organization is one that is fraught with 
complexities. The issues that have developed in this context 
are reflected in the modern realities for these 
organizations. As more information is acquired about these 
organizations, scholars are now being challenged to look 
beyond the history of development to garner a more integral 
understanding of the impact of these organizations on 
military operations.16 Although some analysis has been 
undertaken to assess the impact of modern military 
                     
15Virginia Newell and Benedict Sheehy, 69. 
16Steven Brayton. “Outsourcing war: mercenaries and the privatization 
of peacekeeping.” Journal of International Affairs, 55(2), (2002): 304. 
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organizations17, the results that have been reported in the 
literature demonstrate a mixed picture about the 
effectiveness and efficiency of these services.18 
3. Effectiveness and Efficiency of PMCs 
With this rudimentary understanding of the context and 
scope of private military corporations highlighted, it is 
now possible to consider what has been noted about issues of 
effectiveness and efficiency in these organizations. Jackson 
in his review of the efforts of private military 
organizations argues that despite the negative opinion of 
these organizations, PMCs have been highly effective in 
resolving short-term conflict.19 However, this author does 
note that when PMCs are used as a force for stabilization, 
they have relatively little impact on the development of 
long-term stabilization in a given region.20 
Interestingly, Brayton has also demonstrated the 
effectiveness of private military organizations in short-
term conflict resolution.21 Looking at the operations of 
Executive Outcomes in Angola and Sierra Leone, Brayton 
asserts that this organization was highly effective in 
restoring state power. Although Executive Outcomes was 
successful in its operations, Brayton does note that 
operations in both Angola and Sierra Leone were costly to 
the governments. In Sierra Leone, the costs of services 
provided by Executive Outcomes were more than one-third of 
                     
17Paul Jackson, 34. 
18Steven Brayton, 304. 
19Paul Jackson, 34. 
20Ibid. 
21Steven Brayton, 311. 
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the country’s military budget for the year or $35 million. 
In Angola, the total costs of service were $40 million.22 
Given that both of these countries are severely 
impoverished, Brayton asserts that there are some questions 
with respect to the ethical issues involved in providing 
military support for economic gain.23 
The results offered by these authors demonstrate that 
while private military organizations have been effective in 
their efforts to perform their assigned tasks, the costs or 
efficiency of these operations has been quite exorbitant. 
With this in mind, it becomes evident that there are two 
specific dimensions of private military organizations that 
need to be considered: effectiveness and efficiency. Only by 
addressing these two issues, will it be possible to provide 
a more accurate understanding of the overall impact of these 
organizations. 
4. Definitions of Effectiveness 
The importance of effectiveness to the context of this 
investigation warrants a review of what has been noted about 
the definition of this term. A precursory overview of what 
has been noted about the definition of this term suggests 
that it has been defined in a wide range of contexts.24 
Fletcher, in her investigation of defining effectiveness, 
asserts that the underpinnings of effectiveness must be 
                     
22Steven Brayton, 311. 
23Ibid. 
24J. Fletcher. “Changing government, changing cultures? Moving the 
quality agenda towards effective processes to counterbalance performance 
outcomes.” Journal of Nursing, 9(3), (2001): 177. 
http://navynps.library.ingentaconnect.com/content/bsc/jnm/2001/00000009/
00000003/art00007;jsessionid=16pbr4skc5p0z.victoria#avail [Accessed 28 
March 07]. 
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delineated before a definition of the term can be 
established. According to this author, effectiveness has no 
real meaning unless it is directly linked to a measurement 
of outcomes of a specific situation.25 As such, 
effectiveness is a contextual variable that must be defined 
based on a specific situation. 
In an effort to better understand how effectiveness can 
be contextually defined, Godard reports that organizations 
can employ a host of specific and objective criteria that 
can be used to measure organizational effectiveness.26 For 
example, organizations can choose to examine managerial 
effectiveness based on a comparison of current managerial 
efforts in the organization compared with managerial efforts 
exhibited by other organizations or outlined in the popular 
press.27 Effectiveness measures can also be developed in the 
context of more objective measures, which limit the biases 
that can occur in assessment. Objective measures include 
those that provide a statistical analysis of data for the 
purposes of drawing specific conclusions.28 
5. Definitions of Efficiency 
The importance of efficiency has also been identified 
as critical to this investigation. Here again a overview of 
what has been noted about the definition of this term seems 
to suggest that efficiency has been defined in a number of 
                     
25J. Fletcher, 178.  
26John Godard. “Do implementation processes and rationales matter? 





contexts.29 In spite of this however, some scholars believe 
that efficiency is a purely quantitative measures.30 As 
reported by Liu, “Efficiency refers to the ratio of input to 
output; higher efficiency can be achieved if greater output 
is produced from a given input.”31 This author goes on to 
argue that efficiency is often tied directly to inequality. 
The more inequality that exists in a given situation, the 
more efficiency that will be garnered. While efficiency can 
be measured in quantitative terms, Liu insists the more 
qualitative definitions of inequality are needed to fully 
illuminate the range of impact of this issue.32 
Although Liu believes that efficiency has a specific 
definition that provides for strict quantitative analysis of 
information Knoedler, in her examination of efficiency, 
asserts that this term can have both qualitative and 
quantitative meanings. This author does note that in most 
instances, the quantitative aspects of efficiency are 
stressed.33 However, according to Knoedler, efficiency is 
often applied as a central variable to assess the costs of 
an operation and whether or not these costs are justified. 
Even though quantitative assessments are important, Knoedler 
contends that qualitative analysis is often needed to 
supplement any efficiency analysis.34 
                     
29Janet T. Knoedler. “Veblen and technical efficiency.” Journal of 
Economic Issues, 31(4), (1997): 1011. 
30Guoli Liu. “The politics of marketization: Inequality versus 
efficiency.”  Asian Affairs, An American Review, 24(3), (1997): 163. 
31Ibid. 
32Ibid., 165. 




Based on the review of the current literature on 
private military corporations, it is evident that a greater 
understanding of both the effectiveness and the efficiency 
of these organizations must be assessed. Using this as a 
basis for developing a methodology, a case study examining 
these specific issues in the context of current private 
military corporations is warranted. A case study approach 
will allow for an intensive investigation of issues of 
effectiveness and efficiency, such that a clear framework 
for comparison of PMCs on these two issues can be 
undertaken. The following provides a review of the 
subsequent information that will follow in this research. 
1. Background on the Issue 
To provide an overview of the current operations and 
activities undertaken by private military organizations, the 
long and complex history of mercenaries, their relationship 
to the state and the services provided must be considered in 
order to lay the groundwork for this investigation. While 
this research indicates that PMCs evolved from mercenaries, 
it is important to consider the evolution of mercenaries in 
examining the modern PMC. A review of what has been noted 
about this history suggests that mercenaries were utilized 
by the state during the Roman Empire.35  
 
 
                     
35Evelyn Shirley Shuchburgh. A History of Rome to the Battle of 
Actium, (New York: Macmillan, 1912): 156. 
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2. Case Study on Effectiveness 
Once the basic history of mercenaries and private 
military corporations has been established, it will then be 
possible to create a case study on the effectiveness of 
these organizations. Drawing on information on the specific 
purposes and goals of these organizations, a framework for 
delineating the context of measuring effectiveness will be 
established. This case study will synthesize basic 
information on the private military corporation as a central 
means for highlighting key contextual elements of 
effectiveness. Based on this framework, it will then be 
possible to effectively evaluate the effectiveness of 
private military organizations. Results of the case study 
will then be utilized for comparison to efficiency issues in 
the private military organization. 
3. Case Study on Efficiency 
A case study on efficiency in private military 
organizations will also be needed. This case study will also 
draw on background information on PMCs in an effort to 
identify specific efficiency variables that can be used for 
analysis. Once this framework has been established, it will 
then be possible to analyze PMCs and their operations to 
delineate and define efficiency in these organizations. The 
data from this case study will then be compared with data on 
the effectiveness of PMCs to garner a more effective picture 





The final part of this investigation will draw together 
data from the case studies to make some generalizations 
about the effectiveness and efficiency of private military 
organizations. Based on this data, it will be possible to 
identify key issues for the development and control of these 
organizations. With this data, recommendations for 
implementing service will be made. It is hoped that this 
data will be used to inform policy development in 
establishing more effective and efficient contracts between 
private military corporations and the federal government. 
5. Limitations of the Study 
Although this research represents a comprehensive study 
of private military organizations, the research is based on 
secondary sources. As such, no empirical data will be 
collected in the context of this investigation. However, 
given the relative dearth of information and research on 
this subject, a clear qualitative basis for further 
investigation must be established. The case study approach 
described in this methodology should provide a springboard 
for further empirical research on this subject. 
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II. BACKGROUND ON PRIVATE MILITARY CORPORATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
An overview of what has been noted about the 
development of private military corporations suggests that 
these institutions evolved from mercenary operations.36 
Although considerable evolution has taken place in the 
context of private military organizations since the time of 
mercenaries, the realization that PMCs have their origins in 
mercenary operations provides a clear starting point for 
examining the background of private military organizations. 
As such, this review will consider some of the more notable 
events that have occurred in the history of evolution of 
private military corporations. 
B. HISTORY OF MERCENARIES 
1. Early History: The Roman Empire 
As noted earlier, historical analysis indicates that 
Roman government was among the first state institutions to 
utilize mercenaries.37 In particular, the Mercenary War that 
took place in 240 BC is among the first mention of 
mercenaries in ancient history.38 Researchers examining this 
event report that the war represented an uprising of various 
mercenary groups that had been in the employ of Carthage. 
Having returned home from defending Rome in Africa, several 
                     
36Doug Brooks, 130. 
37Evelyn Shirley Shuchburgh, 156. 
38Susan Raven. Rome in Africa, (London, Routledge, 1993): 36. 
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mercenary groups awaited payment for their services from 
Hamilcar. However, Hamilcar argued that the losses sustained 
by the Roman army were so substantial that he was not 
willing to pay the mercenaries. In response the mercenaries 
waged war against Carthage for more than three years. In the 
end, the mercenaries won, demonstrating their ability to be 
both savage and ruthless.39 Interestingly, more is written 
about the Mercenary War than the use of mercenaries in 
Carthage’s war against Africa. 
Not surprisingly, this incidence of mercenary action in 
the Roman Empire is not the only instance in which the 
prominence of mercenaries is noted. Dyck, in his examination 
of Rome’s use of mercenaries, reports that when Gaius Julius 
Caesar undertook his campaign against the Germans in 58 BC 
he utilized 400 mercenaries from Germany to successfully 
push the enemy back into Gaul.40 During this campaign, 
German mercenaries worked on the front lines of the Roman 
army, utilizing traditional battle tactics such as a 
columnar or “boar's head” charge. “Ostensibly carried out by 
a mass of enraged berserkers, such an attack was calculated 
to break the enemy by its sheer ferocity.”41 Dyck insists 
that Caesar’s use of German mercenaries enabled the Roman 
army to utilize the barbarity and ferocity of the German 
army to an advantage.42 
 
                     
39Susan Raven, 37. 
40Ludwig H. Dyck. “Gaius Julius Caesar took advantage of his German 
enemies ferocity by enlisting them in his cavalry.” Military History, 




2. Britain’s Early Use of Mercenaries 
As the Roman Empire began its steady decline, the 
British Empire began to begin its slow evolution. During the 
course of this process, historical analysis demonstrates 
that Britain also utilized mercenaries. In addition to using 
mercenaries to fight battles against Rome, Britain also used 
mercenaries to fight internal battles among warring factions 
within in the state.43 Later, Britain used mercenaries to 
fight against the colonist during the American Revolution.44 
What this history suggests is that a closer look at the 
British Empire and its use of mercenaries is warranted to 
better understand the evolution of the modern private 
military corporation. 
Millar has examined the utilization of mercenaries by 
Henry VIII in an effort to wage war on France. According to 
Millar, Henry established a strong alliance with Spain and 
the Netherlands; however the army that had been assembled 
was unprofessional, at best.45 Further, France had developed 
a stable permanent army, which was capable to defeating 
England. In order to win the war, Henry VIII had to employ 
private mercenaries: “As regards mercenaries, free-lance 
warriors hired and paid for by Henry himself, about 6,200 
were retained: 2,800 men-at-arms, mounted arquebusiers and 
light cavalrymen, plus 3,400 assorted infantrymen. Among the 
                     
43G.W.S. Barrow. Feudal Britain: The Completion of the Medieval 
Kingdom, 1066-1314, (London: Edward Arnold, 1956): 85. 
http://www.questia.com/library/book/feudal-britain-the-completion-of-
the-medieval-kingdoms-1066-1314-by-g-w-s-barrow.jsp [Accessed 02 April 
07]. 
44Daniel Marston. The American Revolution, 1774-1783, (New York: 
Routledge, 2003): 20. 
45Gilbert John Millar. “Mercenaries under Henry VIII, 1544-1546.” 
History Today, 27(3), (1977): 173. 
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mercenary leaders who, at the beginning of the war, can be 
identified, Germans, Dutchmen, Italians and Spaniards 
predominate.”46 
Examining the specific reasons why Henry chose to 
utilize mercenaries, Millar asserts that while the 
unprofessional nature of the armed forces was a driving 
force behind the development of a mercenary army, there was 
another underlying force shaping mercenary use. “What the 
English lacked, and what foreign sources alone could supply 
in quantities, were battle hardened regulars skilled in the 
latest practices of continental warfare.”47 In short, 
England needed individuals that were capable of engaging in 
fierce combat. Millar goes on to report that while reports 
of the successes of the mercenaries seem to suggest that 
these individuals provided Henry with the required services, 
Henry records the actions of the mercenaries as “no good.”48 
3. Machiavelli’s Observations on Mercenaries 
By the time Britain began regularly employing 
mercenaries for armed combat, Niccolo Machiavelli had 
written his seminal work, The Prince. In this work, 
Machiavelli addressed the use of mercenaries by rulers. 
Although Machiavelli advocates the limited use of 
mercenaries in a state or republic’s army, he contends that 
mercenaries cannot be the sole source of a country’s 
military power. Machiavelli substantiates this assertion by 
making the following observations: 
                     




Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and 
dangerous; and if one holds his state based on 
these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; 
for they are disunited, ambitious and without 
discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, 
cowardly before enemies; they have neither the 
fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction 
is deferred only so long as the attack is; for in 
peace one is robbed by them, and in war by the 
enemy. The fact is, they have no other attraction 
or reason for keeping the field than a trifle of 
stipend, which is not sufficient to make them 
willing to die for you.49 
4. Mercenaries in the American Revolution 
Despite the fact that such notably negative sentiment 
had developed with respect to mercenaries, by the time of 
the American Revolution, the contracting of mercenaries had 
become a business for many European nations. According to 
one scholar, “Charles (1670-1730) was the first ruler of 
Hesse-Cassel to adopt the system of hiring out his soldiers 
to foreign powers as mercenaries and as a way of improving 
national finance. Frederick II (1760-1786) hired out 
Hessians to England for some 3,191,000 British pounds to 
assist in the war vs. North American colonies.”50 Thus, when 
the British were only able to muster 55,000 troops for a war 
against the colonies, the King of England had no choice but 
to seek support from mercenaries. In many respects the 
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Hessians that were employed by the British army become one 
of the most infamous mercenary groups in history.51 
A review of what has been noted about Hessian 
mercenaries employed during the American Revolution suggests 
that these individuals were among the most demoralized 
soldiers to work for Britain. “The Hessians who served 
involuntary under the British colors, at first opportunity, 
defected. Muster rolls of the Hessian regiments showed that 
probably more than half simply deserted; and in times 
settled down as peaceful citizens of the colonies which they 
had been sent to subdue.” In addition, the Hessians were 
known for their propensity to turn on the British troops. 
Many became thieves and looters; most were unreliable in 
their efforts to provide support to the British military.52 
In addition to the inherent problems associated with 
the Hessian mercenaries, scholars also report that the 
plight of the Hessians made them sympathetic to American 
colonists. “It was a policy of the Americans, and approved 
by the Congress as well and by Washington to lure the 
Hessians.”53 In many instances, Hessians became so fond of 
their American supporters that they volunteered to join 
American forces in battle. After the Revolution, many of the 
Hessians were relocated to various parts of Pennsylvania, 
New Jersey and Maryland; few were sent back to Europe.54 
Unfortunately, the instability of mercenary forces in the 
war promulgated defeat for the British. Although mercenaries 
                     





were contracted to improve the outcome for Britain, scholars 
argue that Hessian mercenaries may have been the deciding 
force that enabled the colonists to overcome the British and 
win the war.55 
C. THE EVOLUTION OF MERCENARIES 
The brief history of mercenaries provided in this 
investigation demonstrates the complexity of utilizing 
mercenaries for managing important state affairs. Although 
mercenaries clearly provide a means to an end in most 
instances, the reality is that mercenaries were unreliable 
and often uncommitted to the needs of the state. Further, as 
this brief history demonstrates, rulers have attempted to 
diminish the authority of mercenaries by refusing to pay or 
failing to provide them with the respect of the state. In 
the end, the use of mercenaries became a tenuous and 
precarious practice, which contributed to the inability of 
Britain to effectively overcome colonial powers. 
Although the history of mercenaries demonstrates the 
devolution of mercenary groups—demonstrating them to be 
nothing more than barbarians, disrespectful of the state—
other scholars examining the evolution of mercenaries into 
private military corporations assert that there were a host 
of factors that prompted the decline of traditional 
mercenaries in the nineteenth century.56 Specifically, Avant 
argues that changes in the social and political context of 
the nation prompted rulers to develop citizen armies that  
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could provide the state with a reliable military force. 
Thus, as citizen armies grew, states had little use for 
mercenaries.57 
In an effort to demonstrate how the need for citizen 
armies arose, Avant examines the development of these 
military organizations during the time of the Napoleonic 
Wars. According to this author, notable changes in the 
context and demographic composition of society had occurred, 
prompting leaders to consider the best methods for effective 
protection of the state. In particular, Avant asserts that 
the material pressures of society forced the development of 
citizen armies: “territorial expansion and organizational 
and technological changes in military organizations were 
required to respond effectively to this growth.”58 
Additionally, Avant argues that the Age of Enlightenment had 
brought with it new methods for conceptualizing the 
relationship between states and soldiers. Avant asserts that 
the convergence of these two social forces is what prompted 
the evolution of citizen armies during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.59 
The decision of various states to move toward citizen 
armies was clearly fueled by changes in the social context 
of developing society. However, as Avant reports, many 
states had come to realize the challenges involved in 
employing mercenaries. In response to the complexities of 
using mercenary forces, “rulers entered international 
agreements to deligitimize the use of mercenaries because 
                     




they were concerned with being drawn into war by the actions 
of their citizens. This concern led states to make it 
illegal for their citizens to fight abroad, thus eroding the 
supply of mercenaries.”60 Thus, the decision to move away 
from mercenaries was reflective of the desire by the state 
to control external conflicts and to improve the outcomes of 
state building in regional development. 
Other scholars have made similar observations about the 
evolution of mercenaries during the nineteenth century.61 
For instance, Shearer reports that “with the rise of 
nationalism in the nineteenth century, the idea of fighting 
for one's country rather than for commercial interests 
gained currency. Governments came to command a monopoly over 
violence and became increasingly keen on limiting the risks 
to their neutrality that arose when their citizens fought 
other peoples' wars.”62 What this effectively demonstrates 
is that the problems associated with employing mercenaries 
had come full circle. Governments, realizing the political 
issues raised in the context of contracting mercenaries 
chose to acquire more control of political affairs, making 
it more difficult for mercenaries to profit from state wars. 
1. Toward Private Military Corporations 
As the potency of mercenary forces began to wane—as a 
result of social and political forces—states were still 
faced with substantial challenges when it came to protecting 
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their interests in foreign countries. Brayton in his 
assessment of the rise of private military corporations 
asserts that this reality was especially true for weak 
governments in developing nations.63 As reported by this 
scholar: 
The increasing inability of weak governments to 
counter internal violence has created a ready 
market for private military forces. Fueled by a 
post-Cold War shift away from the strategic 
confrontation of major powers in such countries 
as Mozambique, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, Western 
countries are more reluctant to intervene 
militarily in weak states, and their politicians 
are disinclined to explain casualties to their 
electorates.64 
Thus, weak government’s not only found it hard to 
substantiate their power, but also developed nations in the 
West were unwilling to provide the military support needed 
to help embattled governments.65 
The situation created in the context of weak 
governments is one that has served as the impetus for the 
development of the modern private military organization. 
Brayton goes on to argue that, when originally developed, 
private military organizations sought to work with state 
militaries to improve operations. “Their commercial goals 
are to improve their clients' military capabilities, 
permitting more effective combat performance and deterrence 
capability. The companies provide military assessments, 
training or weapons procurement. Direct involvement in 
combat is less common, although some companies advertise 
                     




their skill in this area.”66 Further, Brayton goes on to 
report that the new private military organizations structure 
contracts such that they are able to avoid the political 
implications that were once associated with mercenary 
forces.67 
2. Current History of Private Military Corporations 
Based on what has been noted about the evolution of the 
private military corporation, it seems reasonable to argue 
that these institutions developed out of a direct need for 
weak governments to assert their power in the context 
domestic and regional conflict. Interestingly, however, as 
noted by Brooks, the modern history of the private military 
organization is still somewhat difficult to assess. As 
reported by this scholar, “The international private 
military services industry is still an infant industry in a 
state of flux. Essentially, the bulk of the industry has 
only existed since the end of the Cold War.”68 Although 
there is a number of small, niche PMCs, larger organizations 
that offer a wide range of military and military support 
services are only now emerging.69 
Brooks notes that a few PMCs have gained substantial 
notoriety in recent years. In particular, Brooks notes the 
success of American-based Armor Holdings. Based in 
Jacksonville, Florida, the organization began operations in 
1969 providing body armor, industrial security and non-
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lethal weapons. Although the organizations struggled to 
remain solvent in the 1970s, in the late 1990s, Armor was 
able to increases its revenues, making more than $150 
million annually. Armor has engaged in aggressive 
acquisitions allowing the organization to expand its 
services to the international community.70 Brooks also 
considers the development of Defense Systems Limited or DSL. 
The organization, which is based on England, provides the 
British military with support on highly sensitive political 
missions. Additionally, this organization provides service 
to the United Nations, despite the UN’s desire not to 
privatize its military operations.71 
The assessment of private military organizations 
provided by Brooks reflects efforts on the part of civilized 
society to provide military support to developing nations. 
As reported by this author, private military organizations 
often choose to focus on peacekeeping, peace enforcement, 
military assistance and humanitarian rescue operations.”72 
Although these goals appear to highlight a more altruistic 
side of private military organizations, it is important to 
note that altruism is not always the case.73 In particular, 
one author contends that, “the development of mercenary 
firms is directly related to the globalization of the market 
economy and two major aspects of it: the emergence of a more 
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violent world and the growing privatization of warfare.”74 
What this effectively suggests is that not all private 
military corporations seek to provide solutions that will 
facilitate peacekeeping. In many instances, private military 
organizations have been developed to help weak state 
governments improve their political and economic hold on a 
particular region. 
D. SUMMARY 
The review of the evolution of private military 
organizations provided here attempts to highlight many of 
the critical issues that have shaped development of these 
new institutions. Although private military organizations 
have moved away from traditional mercenary activities, the 
research provided here seems to indicate that mercenary 
forces have come full circle in their evolution to private 
military organizations. Specifically, this research 
demonstrates that mercenary forces devolved into chaotic, 
barbaric organizations that could not be controlled by the 
state. This coupled with changes in society forced a shift 
to citizen armies. While this shift meant the ostracism of 
mercenaries on legal and political grounds, the rise of 
strong citizen armies created a context in which smaller 
governments that were unable to raise formidable citizen 
armies, had few options for protecting their interests. 
As a direct consequence of imbalances in political and 
military power in developing nations, governments soon found 
that legitimizing mercenary action through the establishment 
of private military organizations was the most formidable 
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method for protecting the power of the individual state. In 
the end, private military organizations—regardless of the 
services that they provide—have become a legitimized 
mercenary force that evades the political implications 
associated with traditional mercenary forces. Thus, 
mercenary forces have come full circle in the establishment 
of private military corporations. 
 29
III. CASE STUDY—THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PMCS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
With a basic history of the private military 
corporation provided, it is now possible to look at these 
organizations in terms of modern development and practice. 
Although it is evident that the privatization of PMCs have 
forced these organizations to operate with some degree of 
effectiveness—in order to remain in business—there is a 
clear need to delineate how effective these organizations 
have been in improving outcomes for the state. Only by 
examining the effectiveness of the private military 
organization will it be possible to provide a more integral 
understanding of both the function and important of these 
organizations for modern military operations. 
Although the proposal of examining the effectiveness of 
private military organizations appears to be quite 
straightforward, it is necessary to first provide some 
definition and framework for the specific dimensions of 
effectiveness that will be utilized in examining these 
organizations. To this end, this case study first considers 
a thorough review of what has been noted about the 
definition of effectiveness. Through a careful examination 
of this variable, it will be possible to develop a formal 
framework for evaluating the effectiveness of private 
military corporations. This framework will then be utilized 
to provide a clear review of the effectiveness of modern 
private military corporations. 
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B. DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE OF EFFECTIVENESS 
Based in the data provided above, it becomes evident 
that a clear rationale for assessing effectiveness in the 
private military organization must be developed. Thus, in 
order to develop this rationale, it is first necessary to 
consider the specific purpose and mission of the private 
military organization. Reviewing the current literature on 
this subject, a wide range of duties and responsibilities 
for the private military organization is revealed.75 Private 
military corporations provide states with support that 
ranges from ancillary support for combat operations to 
participation in combat activities. Regardless of the 
specific actions taken by these organizations however, each 
is charged with providing the state with the key support 
that it needs in order to ensure success in military 
operations. 
In an effort to better understand the state’s decision 
to employ the use of private military organizations, Newell 
and Sheehy argue that the central purpose of employing 
private military organizations is to improve the 
effectiveness of the state in its ability to accomplish its 
military missions. Specifically, these authors explicate 
this process and rationale as follows: 
The privatization of the public sector is a trend 
in institutionally and economically strong states 
that has been dominant since the Reagan-Thatcher 
ear. It is driven by the basic belief that 
governments are inefficient suppliers of goods 
and services, and by political commitment to the 
philosophy that such government activity impinges 
on the liberty of citizens. These beliefs 
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translate into a policy that seeks to maximize 
efficiency and effectiveness while minimizing the 
costs to the sate and requires the introduction 
of competition into previously closed public 
sectors.76 
These authors go on to argue that this process creates a 
situation in which specific roles once filled by the state 
are not provided by the public sector. In this context 
greater accountability for action and outcomes becomes 
critical for assessing these organizations.77 
Placing these assertions into the context of the models 
provided by Childers and van House for evaluating the 
effectiveness of the organization, it appears as if the goal 
model and open systems model need to be converged in order 
to comprehensively understand and define effectiveness in 
the private military organization. In terms of the goal 
model, the overarching goal of the state in achieving 
success in its military operation must be accessed, rather 
than the specific goals of the PMC in individual military 
operations. In the context of the open system model, the 
effectiveness of the private military organization should be 
reflected in the willingness of the state to continue to 
hire private military organizations for resolving conflict. 
In short, if PMCs perform their duties correctly, states 
should win their military campaigns and continue to seek the 
support and assistance of private military organizations. 
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C. EFFECTIVENESS OF PRIVATE MILITARY CORPORATIONS 
With a specific framework for the examination of 
effectiveness in private military organizations developed it 
is now possible to provide a review of what has been noted 
about these particular parameters of effectiveness. This 
review will consist of the literature available on 
operations of private military organizations in helping 
states secure military victories. Further, this review will 
consider the extent to which private military organizations 
continue to be utilized as a principle force for improving 
the outcomes of military operations. 
1. Private Military Corporations and Success 
A critical review of what has been noted about the 
success of the private military corporation seems to suggest 
that, in most instances, these organizations have been 
highly successful in helping states achieve their goals. 
Jackson, in his review of the overall success of private 
military organizations argues that in terms of international 
peacekeeping missions undertaken by organizations such as 
the United Nations, private military organizations have been 
quite successful.78 Specifically, this author makes the 
following observations: “Despite their negative image, many 
of these PMCs were in many cases more effective in resolving 
conflicts than the international community, took an active 
interest in the well-being of the local population and 
cannot be blamed for the fact that the long-term stability 
did not come to the countries in which they operated.”79 
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Brayton has also noted the success of private military 
organizations. Specifically, this author examines the 
outcomes for Executive Outcomes in both Angola and Sierra 
Leone. According to this author, in 1993 rebels from the 
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) 
took control of oil reserves during the Angolan civil war. 
In an effort to regain control the state contracted with 
Executive Outcomes to remove UNITA from power. The 
organization quickly seized control of oil operations with 
minimal casualties and damage to equipment. As a result of 
the success of this operation, Executive Outcomes was 
awarded a permanent contract for protecting the country’s 
oil reserves.80 
In 1995, the government of Sierra Leone faced 
substantial problems as rebels had taken control of key 
diamond mines in the country. Executive Outcomes was 
contracted to remove the rebels from power. The organization 
accomplished its goals in a timely manner, restoring 
government control over the diamond mines. Executive 
Outcomes remained in Sierra Leone to provide support for 
local militias battling the rebel Revolutionary United Front 
(RUE). After 22 months, the government was again able to 
regain control of the country from rebel leaders. Brayton 
notes that services provided by Executive Outcomes totaled 
$35 million. Although this cost was more than one-third of 
the country’s annual defense budget, this cost was 
considered to be a bargain compared to the services provided 
by the UN observer force, which supplied military support  
 
                     
80Steven Brayton, 304. 
 34
after the conflict was resolved. For only eight months of 
service, the UN observer force cost the government more than 
$47 million.81 
Even though there is evidence that private military 
organizations have indeed created notable advantages for 
resolving short-term conflict, there have been concerns 
raised about the ability of these organizations to address 
the long-term problems faced by the state. For instance, 
Newell and Sheehy make the following observations about the 
failures of private military organizations: “Lacking public 
accountability, corporations frequently fail to operate 
facilities and offer services with an eye to the public 
good. While they can hardly be faulted for this—after all, 
public good is not their province—they are responsible for 
failing to fulfill properly their contractual 
obligations.”82 These authors go on to notes that the 
failure of private military organizations to successfully 
provide service has forced some states to consider “de-
privatization” of some military operations.83 
Schwartz and Watson have also noted some problems with 
the overall effectiveness of private military organizations. 
In particular, these authors note the challenges that have 
developed in the context of using these organizations to 
fight the war on drugs in South America. While most short-
term operations are successful these author report that when 
missions are not successful, the U.S. military is expected 
to intervene in order to complete the mission and resolve 
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the problems encountered by the PMC.84 Critics of PMCs have 
argued that, “There's a great lack of transparency when you 
contract out, yet if something happens, we're supposed to 
use our military to go in and rescue them and get involved 
in other conflicts.”85 
Isaac and Harrison further scrutinize the success of 
private military organizations arguing the scrutiny of these 
institutions has yielded a number of notable problems. “PMFs 
[private military firms] and their employees have been 
accused of not having the requisite integrity for combat 
operations, of overcharging clients, of corruption and war 
profiteering.”86 In addition, these organizations have been 
accused of utilizing their ambiguous legal status to garner 
immunity for most of their actions.87 Thus, while private 
military organizations may be successful in their efforts to 
quell conflict, the methods used to achieve these ends draws 
into question the overall ability of these institutions to 
be effective for meeting the goals of the state in terms of 
the push toward privatization in military operations. 
2. Private Military Corporations and Extent of Their 
Employment 
In addition to assessing the success of actions taken 
by private military organizations, some assessment of the 
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extent of their use must also be taken into consideration. 
Whyte, in his examination of the use of private military 
organizations by the United States reports that the utility 
of these organizations has been codified in the development 
of specific legislation that governs the use of services 
from these companies.88 Specifically, this author reports 
that, “Under the United States regulatory system, providers 
of military goods and services must register with the State 
Department. Any contracts worth more than $50 million must 
be notified to Congress. Contracts with foreign governments 
are also arranged indirectly through the Pentagon’s Foreign 
Military Sales Department without the need for a license.”89 
What this effectively suggests is that PMCs have become so 
widely utilized in the United States that formal protocols 
to regulate the actions of these organizations has been 
established. 
The formal protocols that have been established by the 
U.S. government have served as the impetus for shaping the 
utilization of these organizations by foreign governments. 
Whyte goes on to report that when foreign countries contact 
the U.S. for military support, the U.S. government often 
makes recommendations for contracting with PMCs. “PMCs are 
now commonly contracted by foreign governments on the 
recommendation or encouragement of the United States Defense 
Department. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Brunei and Malaysia have 
all more recently been party of major contracts with PMCs 
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based in the United States.”90 Thus, the success of private 
military corporations has been legitimated though the 
development of a formal process for utilizing PMC service 
and providing recommendations for PMC service to other 
states. 
Other scholars examining the utility of private 
military organizations assert that these organizations are 
more widely utilized by states because of the capabilities 
of these organizations.91 In particular, one scholar reports 
that, “PMCs are said to have the advantage of being highly 
flexible and to have the ability to put forces in the field 
extremely quickly, as well as not having the need to go 
through a cumbersome approval procedure to do so.”92 What 
this demonstrates is that there are specific characteristics 
of the private military organization that make them easier 
to use than traditional military forces. These 
characteristics increase the utility of these organizations. 
Another measure of the extent of use for private 
military organizations can be seen in the current war in 
Iraq. According to Roseman: 
According to officials of the U.S.-led Coalition 
Provisional Authority, there are about 20,000 
private security contractors in Iraq, including 
Americans, Iraqis and other foreigners. An 
investigation done by The Guardian estimates 
those private contractors are the second largest 
contingent of armed forces in Iraq. Other sources 
estimate that private military and security 
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contractors are contributing as much as 20 
percent of the total U.S.-led occupation force.93 
This author goes on to report that as many as 35 
corporations have been contracted by the U.S. government to 
provide various services in Iraq. These services range from 
providing support services to military personnel to full 
combat support, which includes security and intelligence 
patrolling.94 In particular, Roseman notes the case of 
Dyncorp, which is providing training the Iraqi police force. 
Taulbee has linked the utilization of private military 
services to the overall success of these organizations. As 
reported by this author, the dramatic increase in the use of 
private military services by states in recent decades is a 
clear indication that these organizations provide some 
degree of success for military operations.95 “Their success 
depends on generating business on an ongoing basis, 
presumably with question of profit, loss, growth and 
sustainability guiding decisions.”96 What this implies is 
that the utilization of PMCs is an indication of their 
success and the success of PMCs serves as the impetus to 
increase their use by state leaders. Based on these 
parameters, one could argue that private military 
organizations have indeed been effective in their 
operations. 
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D. ANALYZING THE DATA 
1. General Observations 
The information provides a mixed picture of the 
effectiveness of the private military organization. For 
instance, while information on the success of these 
organizations suggests that private military organizations 
have proven to be quite capable in effectively creating 
short-term conflict resolution, these organizations do not 
provide substantial long-term support in this area.97 
Further, while private military organizations have been 
successful in providing support in specific conflicts, the 
development of these organizations raises a number of issues 
with respect to the legal and moral obligations of the state 
and of PMCs.98 
The questions of success that have been raised in the 
context of the private military organization appear to stem 
from the difficulties that states have in defining and 
establishing the role of these organizations in the context 
of both domestic and international law. As noted by one 
scholar: 
The central question is essentially whether or 
not PMCs should be allowed to engage in security 
or other military-related activities without 
being placed under the control of national or 
international organizations, and, by implication, 
international law, or if ‘private enterprise’ 
should be allowed to flourish in the same way as 
the market for any other good.”99 
                     




When placed in this context, it would appear as if the 
issue of defining the role of the private military 
organization in the larger context of the state is now 
becoming a central issue for understanding and evaluating 
these organizations. In Chapter II a review of the 
transformation of the private military organization revealed 
that in the twentieth century, the private military 
organization evolved as an institution of private operation 
that was independent of the state. This process of evolution 
was necessary to ensure that the political actions of the 
organization would not interfere with the political action 
of the state. When mercenaries were contracted by the state, 
the state typically became politically involved in conflicts 
in which it had no vested interest. To avoid this pitfall, 
private military organizations were effectively separated 
from the context of the state. 
While this process has ensured that the U.S. and UK do 
not become embroiled in conflicts such as those that 
occurred in Angola and Sierra Leone in the early and mid-
1990s, this process has also created a caveat in defining 
the role of the private military organization in the context 
of law. States are now finding that private military 
organizations are not susceptible to the same national and 
international laws as formal military institutions. As such, 
the same parameters of effectiveness that can be utilized to 
access the effectiveness and success of military operations 
are not suitable for the assessment and evaluation of 
private military organizations. Thus, while effectiveness in 




term successes and proliferation of service use by states, 
there are a host of legal and moral issues that can impact 
overall assessment. 
2. Challenges with Private Military Corporations 
To illustrate the challenges involved in the context of 
private military corporations and their success and failure, 
one only needs to consider the current case of Kellogg Root 
and Brown (KRG), the subdivision of Halliburton that is 
providing private military support for operations in Iraq. 
While critics examining this case are quick to note that KRG 
has made very little profit from its operations in Iraq—as 
the work has proven to be more complex and dangerous than 
originally expected—there is considerable speculation that 
the organization has engaged in deceptive billing practices, 
inflating its costs to garner a higher profit for its 
services.100 
Although the allegations made in this context lie 
outside of the parameters of success and use of private 
military organizations, they clearly highlight the 
challenges that exist when it comes to assessing the 
effectiveness of the private military organizations. While 
KBR may have been effective in delivering service to the 
U.S. military, the success has clearly come at a price. The 
same can be said for utilization. Because the specific 
relationship between the state and the private military 
organization has not been definitively established, that 
which constitutes success can be a variable reality. In 
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short, success can be achieved through lying, cheating and 
stealing. However, when these parameters are applied, is it 
fair to argue that success has been achieved? 
Arguably, the methods that private military 
organizations utilize to achieve their success must have 
some bearing on assessment of success and effectiveness. 
With this in mind, the importance of examining the 
activities of private military organizations in the context 
of the goals of privatization becomes more evident. At the 
outset of this investigation into effectiveness of private 
military organizations, it was argued that the services of 
private military organizations were tapped in an effort to 
improve and enhance the ability of the military to carry out 
its missions. Based on this implied position, private 
military organizations should be held to similar or higher 
standards than traditional military organizations. 
Through the process of privatization, government 
leaders admit that they cannot effectively manage military 
operations. As such, the contracting with private military 
organizations suggests that these companies can meet the 
needs of governments and citizens more effectively. Given 
that the services of PMCs are used as a substitute to 
government military support, this implies that private 
organizations will operate in the same legal and ethical 
parameters as traditional military organizations. Thus, even 
though the role of the private military organization in the 
larger context of the state has not been clearly defined, 
there is an implicit relationship that has been developed 
through the process of privatization. 
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When placed in this context, it becomes evident that 
both the successes of private military organizations and the 
proliferation of use cannot be upheld as uncomplicated 
measures of effectiveness. Rather, the problems experienced 
by PMCs in providing service coupled with the reasons for 
the proliferation of PMC use must also be addressed in the 
context of assessment. When these issues are brought into 
the process of evaluation, it becomes evident that the 
effectiveness of private military organizations is 
compromised. Thus, while PMCs may be able to provide 
targeted support for military operations, this support can 
come at a cost to the underlying principles of 
privatization. 
The realization that the effectiveness of private 
military organizations cannot be definitively established is 
not meant to further sully the reputation of these 
organizations. Rather, the inability to argue that these 
institutions are effective brings to light the need to make 
calculated changes in these organizations. Based on the 
research provided in this case study, private military 
organizations have the ability to provide formidable service 
that is cost effective for governments and citizens. 
However, the context of effectiveness must be considered 
when the actions that must be taken by PMCs to fulfill their 
obligations fall outside of the parameters of traditional 
military organizations. 
Although this application of context to effectiveness 
provides a more integral method for examining the 
effectiveness of private military organizations, it also 
creates a paradox. For example scholars report that private 
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military organizations are often tapped because they are 
able to overcome bureaucratic inefficiencies and provide 
faster service.101 Holding the PMC to the standards of state 
military forces would engender certain bureaucratic controls 
that would invariably impact the effectiveness of the 
private military organization. In the end, holding the PMC 
to the standards of traditional military organizations would 
drastically affect their overall effectiveness. 
The challenges brought to light in addressing the 
effectiveness of the private military organizations 
demonstrate the true complexities involved with assessment 
of the organizations. However, as private military 
organizations consume more taxpayer monies, there will be a 
direct impetus for improving the evaluation of effectiveness 
in these organizations. With this challenge there is a need 
for the state to more definitively define the role of the 
private military organization. If the state argues that the 
effectiveness of these organizations is to be judged solely 
on outcomes, the manner by which PMCs achieve their 
objectives will become irrelevant. Until this justification 
is made however, debate over the formal context in which 
operations take place in PMCs will remain an issue of 
contention for government leaders. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The most interesting from this review of the 
effectiveness of private military organizations is the 
challenges that this process demonstrates when it comes to 
keeping private military organizations as independent 
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military units outside of the context of the state. Even 
though state governments make the delineation to prevent 
undesired political conflicts, this process also prevents a 
clear understanding of how domestic and international law 
should be applied to these organizations. Further, this 
situation also creates a caveat in how moral and ethical 
issues should be applied. While better definition could 
improve this situation, a stricter definition would place 
more restriction on private military organizations, making 
them less effective. 
In the end, the challenges for society and government 
remain to more succinctly define the role that the private 
military organization should play in the state. Even though 
more definition may place some restrictions on the private 
military organization, it is evident that the actions of 
these organizations need to strike some balance between the 
need for efficiency and the purposes of privatization. As 
the expansion of this field continues, it is likely that 
policymakers and scholars will have to reach some consensus 
on this issue. Billions of tax dollars are spent on the 
services of private military organizations each year. Thus, 
accountability for the decision of the government to utilize 
taxpayer funds will have to be substantiated. Without clear 
parameters for assessing and defining effectiveness, 
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IV. CASE STUDY—THE EFFICIENCY OF PMCS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In addition to examining the effectiveness of private 
military corporations, it is also important to consider the 
efficiency of these organizations as well. Although 
efficiency appears to have a universal meaning, much like 
the term “effectiveness” the context of the term must be 
delineated before a clear understanding of its meaning can 
be determined. Thus, in order to evaluate the efficiency of 
the private military corporation, it is necessary to first 
consider how efficiency is defined in general terms and then 
to consider how the term should be defined in the context of 
PMCs. Once a clear understanding of efficiency has been 
provided, only then will it be possible to evaluate the 
efficiency of the private military organization. 
B. DEFINITION OF EFFICIENCY 
The data presented here creates somewhat of a dilemma 
when it comes to defining the term “efficiency.” Although 
there appears to be a general consensus that efficiency 
measures outputs as compared to inputs, the challenges and 
outcomes of efficiency have been debated to some degree. For 
instance, efficiency has been demonstrated to have clear 
ramifications for equality.102 However, in some disciplines, 
scholars assert that efficiency and equality can be 
balanced.103 Thus, this raises the question of how 
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efficiency should be considered in examining the private 
military organization. With such a myriad of methods 
available to measure efficiency, some consideration of this 
issue in the context of this organization must be utilized 
in order to determine the correct parameters for analysis. 
With the realization that efficiency in the private 
military organization may be difficult to define overall, 
finding a suitable framework for analysis is a critical 
issue of concern. Given the private military organizations 
are geared toward providing support for military operations, 
it seems reasonable to argue that efficiency in the military 
would provide some basis for understanding efficiency in the 
private military organization. Kelty in his examination of 
how efficiency is created in the military asserts that 
efficiency is established through the development of 
cohesion among individuals in the organization.104 To 
demonstrate this point, Kelty makes the following 
observations: “Within a group, cohesion can increase speed, 
quality of work, confidence and morale. […] The sharing of 
common goals and common connection of being ‘brothers in 
arms,’ as well as the potential for lethal consequences if 
jobs are not done properly engenders interdependence 
manifested as cohesion.”105 
By the parameters outlined by Kelty, efficiency in the 
military organization is achieved through the creation of 
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cohesion among individuals working toward the same goal. 
When cohesion is achieved, the military operation can work 
more efficiently toward achieving its goal. Thus, the 
efficiency of the military organization is related not only 
to the success of operations, but also in the context of how 
swiftly and quickly success is achieved. When efficiency in 
the military organization is high, this organization will be 
able to successfully achieve goals in a manner that is 
efficient. This efficiency can be measured in terms of time 
or costs in order to highlight the quantitative aspect of 
efficiency. 
While an examination of traditional military 
organizations provide some foundation for assessing 
efficiency in PMCs, it is important to note that the PMC, 
unlike the traditional military organization, is a private 
organization. For this reason, some of the general 
definitions of efficiency that have been highlighted in the 
context of other markets must be considered for application 
to the PMC. Without some consideration of these issues, an 
important dimension of the PMC—i.e. its public context—will 
be excluded, making it difficult to differentiate the PMC 
from traditional military organizations. In short, some 
consideration of the economic aspects of organizational 
performance must be addressed in the context of examining 
the efficiency of private military organizations. 
C. EFFICIENCY OF PRIVATE MILITARY CORPORATIONS 
Given the important of both military and private 
efficiency issues to the private military organization, it 
is evident that both of these issues must be applied in 
order to develop an overall picture of efficiency in these 
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organizations. Using this as a foundation for investigation, 
it is now possible to consider what evidence has been 
provided that demonstrates the efficiency of the private 
military organization in these two contexts. By synthesizing 
what has been recorded on these two issues, it will be 
possible to draw some conclusions about the efficiency of 
the private military organization. The conclusions drawn 
should provide an all-encompassing understanding of 
efficiency, in that they will enable a comprehensive review 
of various aspects of efficiency in the context of the 
private military corporation. 
1. Economic Efficiencies 
A precursory overview of the literature that has been 
recorded on the efficiency of private military organizations 
demonstrates that economic issues have been widely examined 
in with respect to this particular issue. For instance, 
Lawyer has examined the costs associated with PMC and United 
Nations Peace Keeping (UNPK) forces in resolving conflicts 
in Sierra Leone and Angola.106 Table 1 below provides a 
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Table 1.  Costs Comparison for PMC and UNPK Operations107 
 
What this data clearly demonstrates is that the economic 
efficiency of private military organizations in both Sierra 
Leona and Angola were much higher than those for United 
Nations Peace Keeping forces. Although expenditure per 
individual was higher for the PMCs used in the Angola 
mission, fewer individuals were used and overall costs for 
the operation were much lower than for the UNPK forces. 
While Lawyer is able to effectively demonstrate that 
cost savings can be acquired in the context of utilizing 
private military organizations, this author also effectively 
argues that PMCs enable much more efficient resolution of 
armed conflict. As reported by this author, third party 
intervention between warring parties is often the most 
viable means to ensure that a conflict will end. Although 
                     









25m 1.238b 60m 626m 
Costs per 
month (US$) 








$71,429 $108,756 $109,090 $78,900 
 52
both UNPK forces and PMCs provide this intervention, Lawyer 
asserts that PMCs have been more effective in their efforts 
to reduce conflict because of their willingness to use force 
if necessary to resolve a conflict. As reported by this 
author, “the only type of peacekeeping that appears to help 
end a war is that which is backed by a promise to use force. 
Observers or unarmed peacekeepers with no military backup 
will have little positive effect on either negotiations or 
treaty implementation.”108 Biased intervention clearly has a 
direct impetus for creating a definitive end to conflict. 
When placed in this context, Lawyer insists that 
private military organizations not only offer more economic 
efficiency, but also these organizations offer this economic 
efficiency without compromising the needs of the consumer—
i.e. the government or organization that has purchased the 
services of the PMC. Thus, the private military 
organization, as examined by Lawyer, provides all of the 
benefits of efficiency without any of the drawbacks. 
Interestingly, other scholars seeking to understand the 
efficiency of these organizations have also noted the 
observations of economic efficiency in private military 
organizations made by Lawyer. 
Hukill in her examination of the economic efficiencies 
of private military organizations notes the costs associated 
with proposed plans to reduce armed conflict in Sudan.109 
While the UN Security Council has put no official action in 
place, Hukill reports that U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
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has proposed spending $418 million to provide a 5,600-man 
operation in the region. Compared with the $30 million 
estimate provided by private military companies to perform 
the same job, the economic efficiencies of the PMC are 
clearly demonstrated. Private military organizations would 
reduce the cost associated with the operation and utilize 
fewer personnel to complete the mission. Despite the notable 
cost savings however, Hukill asserts that there is 
considerable resistance to utilizing PMCs for the purposes 
of peacekeeping missions.110 
Considering the specific problems that have been noted 
in the context of using private military corporations for 
peacekeeping missions once exclusively handled by the United 
Nations, Hukill reports that “They undermine the principle 
that the state should have a monopoly on organized violence; 
they lure away, with high salaries, special forces in whom 
the military has invested heavily; they operate beyond the 
public's field of vision; and they're functionally 
accountable to no one.”111 Thus, while the benefits for 
ending the conflict can be contained within clear parameters 
of cost savings, there is some concern that private military 
organizations may have a detrimental impact on the authority 
of the state and the development of fair and equitable 
outcomes for all parties involved in conflict. This clearly 
demonstrates the problem of creating inequality at the 
expense of efficiency as noted by Liu.112 
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The economic efficiencies of private military 
organizations have also been examined in the context of the 
cost savings that can be acquired by the federal government. 
“Privatization, in particular, can help meet military needs 
by recapitalizing programs that cannot be adequately funded 
through annual budgets. […] …businesses, using different 
financial concepts and tools, may be able to justify—and 
spread—such investments over time and invoke more efficient 
capital-budgeting decisions.”113 Overall, the costs of 
operating a modern military have become so extensive that 
the federal government has found that private military 
organizations often offer a cost conscious alternative to 
meeting the military needs of the state. 
Despite the fact that numerous scholars have come 
forward to argue in favor of the cost efficiencies of 
private military organizations, there are scholars that 
believe that public military organizations are best suited 
toward managing the needs of combat operations.114 In 
particular, one scholar insists that the uncertainties 
associated with combat make the public military organization 
the most effective method for addressing the needs of the 
state: 
First, there are inevitably uncertainties that 
may greatly change the quantity of resources 
needed to accomplish a particular objective. 
Indeed, the objective itself may change, if, say, 
another state launches hostilities. Contracts 
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cannot be drawn to well cover such unforeseen 
contingencies. Second, asset specificity is an 
issue. Much military training has little value in 
alternative uses and, with the exception of small 
arms and some vehicles; military hardware does 
not have non-military uses. Finally, probity is 
crucial. The head-of-state must be confident of 
the loyalty of the leadership and personnel of 
the defense agency.115 
Because these issues cannot consistently be guaranteed in 
the context of each military mission, there are no real 
economic efficiencies that can be garnered by using the 
services of the private military organization. 
In addition to the fact that there are such notable 
uncertainties that can limit the cost effectiveness of 
private military organizations, Fredland also argues that 
private military operations do not ensure that collateral 
damage is minimized during operations. Fredland insists that 
because casualty issues are not a principle concern for 
private military operations, the costs and successes of 
these operations can be maximized. Fredland alludes to the 
fact that some cost justification in terms of the number of 
lives that are lost, as a direct result of using private 
military organizations as opposed to traditional public 
organizations should be taken into consideration when 
examining the cost efficiencies of private military 
organizations.116 
Even the U.S. government reports some degree of 
inefficiency in the utilization of private military 
organizations for rebuilding Iraq. In particular, a recent 
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report released by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) 
demonstrates that of the 15 percent of the budget allocated 
for reconstruction in Iraq, eight percent was being utilized 
to secure private military support for contractors working 
in the country. The costs for providing private military 
support have been so high because of the evolving nature of 
the conflict in the country. As the conflict changes and 
intensifies, the U.S. government is witnessing a high 
turnover among private military contractors. For this 
reason, the costs associated with this process have 
increased dramatically.117 
Although high turnover in private military contracts is 
having a negative impact on the ability of the U.S. 
government to efficiently rebuild Iraq, the GAO further 
reports that the services of these organizations are needed. 
Despite the fact that the U.S. military can provide the 
security needed, the central goal and focus of the military 
is not to provide support for private rebuilding operations 
in Iraq. Thus, even if the U.S. military had the effective 
manpower needed by contractors, the public military is not 
trained or prepared for providing this type of support in 
the development of the Iraqi state.118 For this reason, the 
federal government has few alternatives for ensuring the 
safety and security of private contractors working to 
rebuild Iraq. 
Iraq is not the only instance in which inefficiencies 
in using private military organizations has developed. One 
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scholar reports that private military organizations that 
were employed by Bush in 1998 and subsequently Clinton in 
1992 to manage the war in Somalia clearly created 
substantial budget problems for the U.S. government.119 The 
original mission developed under Bush was to employ 2,500 
private military personnel at a price of $180 million. After 
more than 4 years in the country, the cost of the operation 
had mushroomed to more than $2.5 billion as private military 
organizations—principally Halliburton—built Camp Bondsteel 
and other extravagant military facilities in the region.120 
The money spent by the private military organization went 
virtually unchecked by the U.S. government. 
The cost efficiency issue in private military 
organizations stems from the need to analyze the specific 
context of how contracts are developed when PMC services are 
utilized. As reported by Markusen, PMC contracts are unique 
because they contain particular clauses that allow these 
organizations to achieve cost efficiency to ensure internal 
economic performance. According to this author, “Several 
Pentagon contracts are ‘cost-plus,’ meaning the companies 
recoup their costs, including a portion of overhead, and are 
guaranteed a percentage of the costs as profit—a recipe for 
cost inflation.”121 To illustrate this point, this author 
notes the contract that the Pentagon has established with 
Halliburton. In this contract Halliburton has been granted a 
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multibillion-dollar contract to provide private military 
support to the U.S. military for 10 years. Of this total 
cost, Halliburton will be awarded 1 percent of the total 
costs of service in profits.122 
The problems with effective cost analysis highlighted 
by Markusen bring to light the challenges associated with 
developing a clear understanding of the cost efficiencies of 
private military operations. Markusen asserts that while 
some estimates of cost efficiency demonstrate that these 
organizations can save the government between 20 and 30 
percent of the costs associated with traditional military 
operations, these cost savings are only estimated in the 
context of the initial contract. When the final contract is 
developed and the government must allocate the funds for the 
private military organization, specific clauses such as the 
‘cost plus’ clause will have a direct impact on the overall 
cost savings that are garnered by the U.S. government.123 
Despite, what appears to be, clear evidence that 
private military organizations may not be as economically 
efficient as public military organizations, the number and 
extent of these operations continues to proliferate. In 
order to demonstrate this point, one author notes the growth 
in this industry that has occurred in recent years as the 
United States has attempted to address the issue of global 
terrorist organizations and the war in Iraq: 
Established companies have expanded; new ones 
have sprung up. Control Risks, a consultancy, now 
provides armed escorts. It has 500 men guarding 
British civil servants. Global Risk Strategies 
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was a two-man team until the invasion of 
Afghanistan. Now it has over 1,000 guards in 
Iraq--more than many of the countries taking part 
in the occupation…124 
The expansion and proliferation of private military 
organizations seems to suggest that these organizations 
provide some type of efficiency. If efficiency could not be 
achieved in these organizations, why then would governments 
such as the Untied States continue to utilize their 
services? 
2. Internal Efficiencies: Cohesion 
While the issue of economic efficiency is one issue 
that must be assessed in the context of private military 
organizations, the internal efficiency of these 
organizations in terms of cohesion and cooperation must also 
be considered. Although it is difficult to measure this 
variable overall—as few studies have been commissioned to 
look at the activities of private military organizations 
from the inside out, there are some reports in the 
literature of how well these operations functions during 
times of crisis. For instance, Bures, in his review of 
private military organizations notes the case of Executive 
Outcomes (EO) and its report to the UN Security Council 
about potential operations in Rwanda. Although the UN chose 
to utilize its own forces in the conflict, a report provided 
by EO notes that, “EO concluded…that it had had the capacity 
to intervene in Rwanda at the time of the genocide. It 
claimed that it could have had its first armed troops on the 
ground in 14 days and have fully deployed 1,500 personnel, 
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supported by its own air and fire support, within six 
weeks.” This operation would have unfolded and allowed for 
troop deployment in a much shorter time frame than what was 
achieved by UN Security Council forces.125 
This author also goes on to report that there are 
instances when private military organizations have been 
shown to provide services that cannot be otherwise accessed 
by institutions such as the UN Security Council. For 
instance, in a mission to Zaire (now DRC) the UN Security 
Council found that private military organizations could 
deploy within 30 to 90 days providing “services and 
specializations not normally available from the troop-
contributing states, including high-tech aerial 
surveillance, rapid police reaction and humanitarian rescue 
capabilities.”126 What this effectively demonstrates is that 
private military organizations not only have the capability 
of organizing much faster than traditional militaries, but 
also that these organizations have the capacity to 
coordinate highly complex operations that cannot be 
coordinated by public military organizations. 
Other scholars examining this issue have made similar 
observations. In particular, one author reports that, “They 
[PMCs] often possess great flexibility, with an ability to 
create unique solutions for each case, knowledge about the 
problem area and operational expertise, business integrity, 
secure confidentiality, and a generally apolitical 
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nature.”127 This scholar goes on to report that the specific 
context of this process is often the principle reason why 
governments and other organizations hire private military 
organizations. The ability of PMCs to mobilize more rapidly 
and to provide specific services provides these 
organizations with a notable competitive advantage that 
simply cannot be garnered through the use of public military 
organizations. 
Even though the above suggests that the private 
military organization has developed and implemented the 
structures needed to provide quick response to a military 
operation, a recent study published by the RAND Corporation 
notes the inherent risks associated with a lack of military 
hierarchy in the private military organization. According to 
this organization, although private military organizations 
are interested in maintaining their position and public 
image as definitive alternatives for public military 
institutions, the lack of formal structure in these 
organizations makes it difficult for managers and leaders of 
these organizations to ensure employee compliance. In 
particular, this organization reports that, “In an 
undeclared war, contractor personnel are not subject to the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). […] Even if a 
commander could legally direct contract personnel to do 
something, the commander would have no immediate recourse if 
they refused to comply.”128 This inherent lack of control, 
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experts contend, makes the internal operation of the private 
military organization much more inefficient. 
Despite the fact that notable issues have been raised 
in the context of organizational structure and cohesion in 
the private military organization, proponents of these 
organizations argue that these structures are essential to 
the successful operation of the organization.129 
Specifically, one author asserts that, the private military 
organization is structured such that, “There are few layers 
of hierarchy, there is a simple, unified chain of command 
and there is little horizontal differentiation. […] The 
advantage of such a structure is that it can improve 
communication and is flexible. Neither does the structure 
function mechanically, but organically, making it better 
suited to rapidly changing environments.”130 What this 
effectively suggests is that the specific structure that has 
been created in the context of the private military 
organization is essential for successful operation. Even 
though it is difficult for the organization to ensure 
compliance, a decentralized structure that limits 
bureaucracy is essential if the private military 
organization is to provide efficient service. 
D. CONCLUSION 
In an effort to evaluate the efficiency of private 
military organizations, this case study sought to examine 
the PMC along two specific criteria: cost efficiency and 
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cohesion/cooperation. Considering first the issue of cost 
efficiency, the data presented in this case seems to suggest 
that while some areas of cost efficiency have been noted, 
overall private military organizations have not definitively 
proven themselves to be cost efficient entities. In many 
instances, the costs of PMC operations are examined in the 
context of initial contracts and estimates provided by 
leaders in these organizations. When only these specific 
issues are taken into consideration, the costs associated 
with PMC operations appear to be much lower than public 
military operations. However, when the final cost estimates 
are examined, private military operations often cost 
substantially more than their original estimates. Thus, 
there are few clear methods for evaluating the cost 
efficiency of these organizations. 
In addition to cost, the cohesion/cooperation that 
exists in private military organizations was also assessed. 
Based on the data presented here, it is evident that private 
military organizations clearly pose a paradox for assessing 
internal structure as a means to achieve efficiency. Even 
though private military organizations appear to be efficient 
in their ability to provide services in an expedient manner, 
the lack of central control in the organization has been 
noted to be a key factor limiting the efficiency of the 
organization. Thus, while private military organizations may 
be able to provide rapid response and further provide 
services that cannot be provide by traditional military 
forces, the inability of leaders and managers in these  
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organizations to guarantee control over employees can make 
it difficult for private military organizations to be 
efficient in their operations. 
With data on both cost and internal efficiency 
highlighted, it seems reasonable to argue that while there 
are some indications that efficiency can be achieved in 
private military organizations, ensuring efficiency is a 
notable challenge. The very context and structure of the 
private military organization creates inherent problems that 
make it difficult for the organization to operate in an 
efficient manner. Further, given that there are few controls 
placed on these organizations—either internally or 
externally—creating efficiency in these organizations 
represents a notable challenge. While proposals have been 
made to provide further control and restriction on these 
organizations, the imposition of rules on private military 
organizations would diminish any efficiency advantages that 
these institutions may have. 
In the end, it is difficult to argue that private 
military organizations offer an efficient alternative to 
traditional state-sponsored military operations. This is 
especially true in the context of governments such as the 
United States that have formal military organizations that 
are well developed. Even though private military 
organizations may provide developing nations a strategic 
advantage for improving conflict outcomes, the efficiencies 
of these organizations when used by governments of developed 
nations simply cannot be substantiated based on current 
data. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY OF THE DATA 
Based on the data that has been provided in this 
thesis, there are several conclusions that with respect to 
the modern private military corporations (PMC). First, PMCs 
clearly evolved from mercenary groups that were state 
sponsored and employed to improve both the economic and 
political position of a particular government. Second, 
modern private military organizations have developed so that 
mercenary actions performed by these organizations have no 
definitive legal or political ties to the state which 
sponsors them. For this reason, private military 
organizations operate with the intention of providing 
military services for profit, regardless of the state’s 
overall political affiliation or its compatibility with the 
PMC in question. 
Finally, this research demonstrates that even though 
private military organizations have been widely used by the 
United States and other governments, a clear understanding 
of the purpose and function of these organizations is not 
easy to generalize. While some private military corporations 
provide direct combat services, others provide ancillary 
services—such as laundry and food preparation. Although 
there are notable differences in the services that are 
provided, few scholars assess those differences in their 
overall indications. With this in mind, one can see that 
even though it is possible to understand the origins, 
development, and function of the modern private military 
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organization, comprehending degrees of efficiency and 
effectiveness is a difficult undertaking. Even when 
empirical data is provided which demonstrates efficiency or 
effectiveness, the degree to which specific operations in 
private military organizations can be separated and 
evaluated complicates interpretation of the data. 
With no real theoretical frameworks in place to assess 
these organizations based on their function, military 
specialists, leaders and policymakers are without 
established methods for determining the effectiveness and 
efficiencies of these organizations. This research does 
provide, however, a salient starting point for developing 
critical foundations for classifying, assessing and 
evaluating these organizations. Given the paucity of 
analysis that has been provided in the current literature 
with respect to these issues, it is imperative to develop a 
framework for understanding the effectiveness and efficiency 
of these organizations. Only by establishing basic 
parameters for evaluation will it be possible for scholars 
and governments to garner a clear understanding of 
efficiency and efficacy in PMCs. 
It is evident that this is the time in which the most 
critical decisions about the contemporary use of PMCs, both 
militarily and legally, will be made. According to the study 
made for Congress by Elsea and Sarafino on June 21 of 2007, 
updated July 11, 2007, the degree to which private military 
corporations have been included in the Iraqi conflict is 
unprecedented.131 What this means is that the current Iraqi 
conflict will be the military conflict upon which the most 
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important decisions regarding PMCs and future military 
conflict will be made. This also highlights the need for 
close study and an accurate accounting of the successes and 
limitations presented by the use of PMCs. 
1. Effectiveness of Private Military Organizations 
Reviewing the data that has been collected in this 
investigation on the issue of effectiveness in the private 
military organization, it seems reasonable to argue that 
while effectiveness in private military organizations has 
been empirically investigated, the specific parameters 
utilized to define effectiveness have not been critically 
developed. For instance, Jackson considers the success of 
peacekeeping PMC missions.132 Although Jackson is able to 
argue that success demonstrates effectiveness, he does not 
define the concept of effectiveness in terms of clear 
measurable goals for the private military organization. 
Rather, the ability of the PMC to complete its mission is a 
means for proclaiming efficiency. This is contrary to the 
overall definitions of efficiency that are provided in 
Chapter III. 
Reviewing the data provided on the definition of 
effectiveness, it becomes evident that scholars argue that 
while effectiveness is often directly related to the overall 
social good that can be produced, specific definitions of 
effectiveness must be developed to examine individual 
operations and organizations.133 As such, a framework for 
examining effectiveness in the private military organization 
                     
132Paul Jackson, 32. 
133Charles Y. Nakamura and Doris N. Finck, 52. 
 68
is needed. Although success in operations may provide a 
clear basis for developing a definition of effectiveness in 
the private military organization, the reality is that clear 
parameters must be developed and defined. Effectiveness must 
be more than just an arbitrary variable with different 
meanings in different studies. 
Despite a weakness in assessing the effectiveness of 
the private military organization, various models of 
effectiveness have been proposed as a means for examining it 
in the organization.134 Although these frameworks can be put 
in place to examine the effectiveness of the private 
military organization, the results are mixed. To illustrate 
this point, one only needs to consider a comparison of 
results that could be garnered from applying the goal and 
open systems models. Under the goal model the focus of 
effectiveness is achieving a specific end.135 Data has 
clearly demonstrated that the PMC can effectively achieve 
success.136 This would suggest that PMCs could be deemed 
efficient. 
Under the process model, “organizations do not exist 
solely to attain their goals. They are also social groups 
seeking to survive and maintain their equilibrium. Thus, 
effectiveness is measured by internal processes and 
organizational health (for instance, internal communication 
and degree of turnover) as well as by goal attainment.”137 
When applied to the private military organization, measuring 
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effectiveness requires the researcher to look beyond the 
issues of success. Although the private military 
organization can be successful as a mercenary-type 
organization, the effectiveness of the organization cannot 
be sustained in the context of legal issues and rules of 
law. Specifically, issues of human and civil rights of those 
involved in conflict cannot be guaranteed. Thus, even though 
it is possible to demonstrate the success of private 
military organizations, the context in which effectiveness 
is defined for these organizations will impact how 
effectiveness is assessed and determined. 
Based on the results obtained on the effectiveness of 
private military organizations, it seems reasonable to argue 
that government agencies—in particular the Department of 
Defense—need to develop clearly defined terms of 
effectiveness that balance the needs of military operations 
with the legal issues involved in the administration of 
operations in these organizations. In short, the government 
must work to create more clearly defined roles for the 
function and operation of private military organizations. 
Success in private military operations cannot be utilized as 
the focal point for declaring that these organizations are 
effective. This structure is imperative to ensure ability of 
these organizations to effectively provide service while 
still operating within the law. Given the government’s 
extended use of these organizations these measures would 
also provide a benchmark for evaluation of an organization’s 
services in terms of important issues that extend beyond the 
success of operations.   
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Because data is severely limited and because the most 
empirical data is still developing in the current Iraqi 
conflict, it is necessary to consider the degree to which 
new information is incomplete or inaccurate. For example, 
according to Elsea and Sarafino, the State Department’s web 
site does not include an accurate accounting of the number 
of U.S. contractor’s currently in Iraq and they also cite 
the fact that the number of armed civilians operating in 
Iraq is unknown138. Given these gaps, it will be difficult, 
if not impossible, for military leaders to determine the 
degree to which PMCs can assist in successfully completing 
future U.S. military operations.  Insufficient oversight in 
the current campaign, like any corporate activities which go 
unchecked, tend to decrease the quality of services and they 
handicap the development of future services.  
Additionally, effectiveness needs to be understood, to 
a certain degree, to include the public view of the use of 
PMCs in military campaigns, as in the case of the Blackwater 
incident in late September 2007. While this aspect can not 
be measured, it can certainly be seen in terms of public 
support for leaders who are viewed as “too soft” on the 
ethical implications of certain PMC activities. For example, 
Elsea and Sarfino discuss some of the reported activities of 
Blackwater U.S.A in Iraq, and the apparent hiring of known 
human rights violators, which was covered heavily throughout 
2004 and featured prominently in a number of news stories at 
the time.139 Even a cursory review of the news reports in 
print, radio, and television will show that the activities 
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of Blackwater U.S.A as reported had a significant impact on 
the morale of U.S. citizens both civilian and military. In 
addition, to affecting morale, it was clear that support of 
U.S. military efforts shifted dramatically both within the 
military and without. While it is difficult to measure, 
there can be no doubt that the activities of PMCs can 
reflect negatively on the operations of traditional military 
organizations and groups. For that reason alone, it will be 
necessary to develop some degree of military oversight in 
the operation of PMCs. 
2. Efficiencies of Private Military Organizations 
The second issue that was considered in the context of 
this investigation was the efficiency of private military 
organizations. Unlike the issue of effectiveness, efficiency 
was easier to define. Scholars examining the definition of 
efficiency often focused on the issue of economic inputs and 
outputs into a particular organization.140 In short, 
efficiency can be achieved when costs are reduced and 
similar outcomes are achieved. Applying this to the private 
military organization, the decision was made to consider 
efficiency in the context of both economic costs and overall 
operation of the PMC as a private entity. 
An overview of what has been noted on the economic 
efficiencies of private military organizations seem to 
suggest mixed results overall. Although some scholars have 
noted substantial economic efficiency of these organizations 
in providing service to foreign governments, when it comes 
to the economic efficiency of these organizations in terms 
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of the U.S. government, the results are not as positive. For 
instance, Lawyer considered the economic efficiencies of 
PMCs in conflicts in both Angola and Sierra Leone. When the 
costs of these missions were compared with the costs 
associated with utilizing United Nation peacekeeping forces, 
the costs for PMCs were notably less.141 However, Fredland 
in his examination of PMC service provided to the U.S. 
government reports notable economic inefficiencies. What 
this demonstrates is that while efficiency in PMC operations 
can be garnered in some instances, it is not assured in all 
cases.142 
The inefficiencies in PMCs noted by Fredland and others 
appear to be based on a carte blanche mentality that has 
been embraced by private military organizations. Although 
PMCs often provide the lowest bid for completing a specific 
military operation, by the time the operation is complete, 
the PMC has exceeded the original budget. With no real 
recourse, the U.S. government has no alternative but to 
reimburse private military organizations for their services 
regardless of the costs. This pattern of budgetary abuse has 
created a situation in which many do not believe that true 
economic efficiency can be achieved in the context of 
private military organizations.143 
In addition to the specific economic efficiency issues 
that have been noted in the context of private military 
organizations, this research also highlights a number of 
other critical efficiency issues for these organizations. 
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For instance, this research demonstrates that the extent of 
collateral damage is often not a pertinent issue for 
PMCs.144 In addition, because private military organizations 
do not employ a firm hierarchy, there is no guarantee that 
individuals contracted by the organization will perform the 
critical missions needed to ensure the success.145 This 
suggests that there are a number of inherent issues that can 
impact the efficiency of the private military organization. 
Because these issues are not delineated in terms of economic 
costs however, they are often overlooked. 
Here again, the imperative for creating a more 
comprehensive definition of efficiency is demonstrated. 
While economic costs clearly provide a starting point for 
assessing efficiency in the private military organization, 
other efficiency issues—such as loss of innocent lives and 
the ability to adhere to rules of law—must also be taken 
into consideration. Unless these issues are addressed, 
policymakers will not be able to garner a true understanding 
of the efficiency of private military organizations. Thus, 
while efficiency is more easily defined than effectiveness, 
substantial issues with currently developed definitions for 
efficiency remain. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the information collected in this 
investigation, it is now possible to make some 
recommendations for improving effectiveness and efficiency 
in the use of military organization. Given the proliferation 
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and expansion of these organizations that has occurred since 
the end of the Cold War, these issues must be 
comprehensively addressed if the U.S. government and 
military are to ensure both the safety of the American 
people and the financial health of the federal budget. 
Failure to address these issues at this juncture could have 
a detrimental impact on the development of the government 
and its ability to systematically address the operations of 
private military organizations. 
Considering first the issue of PMC effectiveness, it is 
evident that clear parameters for defining and measuring 
effectiveness need to be established by the government. 
Unfortunately this process is not at all straightforward 
overall. Defining effectiveness in the private military 
organization will require the government to identify and 
classify different private military organizations based on 
function and services provided. Utilizing classifications, 
the government must then outline areas of effectiveness that 
must be achieved by these organizations in order for each to 
be considered for providing service to the U.S. military. 
The parameters of effectiveness that are defined must be 
translated into concrete quantifiable measures that will 
allow for comparison of PMCs in various operations. Although 
defining effectiveness will present a substantial challenge 
for the government, operational definitions are clearly 
needed to ensure the proper use of private military 
services. 
Considering next the issue of PMC efficiency, it is 
evident here too that clear parameters for operation and 
financial contracts must be established. If the U.S. 
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government is to benefit financially from the use of private 
military organizations, clear metrics which definitively 
measure the economic efficiency of these organizations must 
be put in place. Without well defined metrics in place, 
neither the U.S. government nor taxpayers will be able to 
determine the efficiency of these operations. With no clear 
means of addressing this issue, methods to improve 
efficiency cannot be developed.   
In fact, the Government Accountability Office recently 
said that they were unable to make a determination regarding 
efficiency in the Iraqi campaign because there was so little 
data, they went on to say that answering the question of 
efficiency would be “time consuming” and expensive.146 
Unfortunately, the degree to which ignoring how PMCs 
function may be a costly or even detrimental venture for 
military operations is not considered, though it was also 
noted that the costs of at least one corporation functioning 
Iraq far exceeded those of the military.147 
Although efficiency parameters are needed, the 
challenge of developing these parameters remains a 
challenging issue. Efficiency is often measured in terms of 
economic output. However, private military organizations 
address issues that extend beyond the realm of economics in 
many instances. For example, collateral damage is often an 
integral part of PMC combat operations. Some assessment of 
these “human costs” must be developed and placed in the 
context of a definition of efficiency. Unless some effort is 
made to include these issues in a working definition of 
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efficiency for PMCs, governments will have no clear means to 
assessing the true efficiency of these organizations. 
While the idea of placing frameworks for effectiveness 
and efficiency on private military organization appears to 
be the most salient means of ensuring the function and 
purposefulness of these organizations, the reality is that 
the imposition of frameworks and rules will create a burden 
for the private military organization. At the present time, 
private military organizations appear to demonstrate various 
dimensions of effectiveness and efficiency from their 
ability to work without clear bureaucratic structures in 
place. If policymakers begin imposing specific frameworks 
for measuring and creating efficiency and effectiveness in 
these organizations, it is possible that these very 
structures will have a detrimental impact on the ability of 
private military organizations to effectively and efficiency 
perform their jobs. Thus, the importance of identifying 
clear parameters for measuring effectiveness and efficiency 
becomes quite clear. In short, government officials need to 
determine what specific attributes of these organizations 
are most important for their operation. 
In addition to highlighting the complexity of 
effectiveness and efficiency issues in the private military 
organization, this research also illuminates the paucity of 
information that is available on these organizations. There 
is a dearth of quantitative information available on the 
operation of these organizations. For instance, scholars are 
not certain how many private military organizations are 
currently in operation in the U.S. and around the globe.148 
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Given that the U.S. government relies so heavily on these 
organizations for military support, it seems reasonable to 
recommend more research on this subject. 
In addition to acquiring more information on these 
organizations, scholars also need to consider a broader 
scope of research on these organizations. For example, 
scholars need to consider what motivates and builds cohesion 
in these organizations to ensure that members perform their 
jobs despite, what may appear to be, overwhelming threats to 
health and personal safety. At the present time there is a 
general lack of information on how these organizations 
operate and function. As such both qualitative and 
quantitative information is needed such that scholars, 
policymakers and military leaders can garner a more integral 
understanding of these organizations. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
In the end, it is evident that research on private 
military organizations is still in its infancy. Even though 
scholars have begun more aggressively pursing investigations 
into this subject, the availability of information on these 
organizations is limited overall. If military leaders and 
policymakers are to make the most of the services offered by 
these organizations more research and understanding will be 
needed to ensure that effectiveness and efficiency in PMC 
operations is achieved. These issues are of critical concern 
given the widespread use of private military organizations 
in various combat and non-combat missions pursued by the 
U.S. government. 
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Although this research provides a starting point for 
investigation, it does not explain all of the challenges 
facing private military organizations. For example, the 
Geneva Conventions specifically deny those employed by PMCs 
the status of “combatant”, leaving them without protections 
from unlawful prosecution or torture.149  Rather, this 
research attempts to piece together some of the research on 
effectiveness and efficiency to demonstrate the need for 
more research on this subject. While the extent and use of 
private military organization services suggests that 
research in this area should be much more advanced that it 
currently is, the reality does not match theory. As such, 
military leaders and policymakers need to aggressively 
pursue data collection on these organizations which will 
ultimately make it more effective and efficient for the 
government to utilize the services of these organizations. 
As stated previously, the opportunity to gain 
information in the current Iraqi conflict is tremendous. 
Though estimates vary, there are currently, on any given 
day, more one thousand Americans known to be operating 
through PMCs under known U.S. contracts in Iraq (the actual 
number certainly exceeds published accounts).150  
Current data makes it clear that PMCs can be both 
significantly more efficient that traditional military 
operations, and significantly less efficient.151 This alone 
indicates the need for even basic levels of oversight for 
future employment of PMCs. The need for the remediation is 
                     




highlighted when one considers that the interest of most 
U.S. citizens to participate in a volunteer army is only 
likely to decrease. Given that the current situation in Iraq 
suggests that unmonitored use of PMCs increases the 
likelihood that inefficient and ineffective corporations 
prone to profiteering will slip through the cracks, we see 
that it is necessary to ensure that the military has 
sufficient oversight in future PMC operations. 
Finally, this research also clarifies the complexity of 
issues involved in developing the private military 
organization. Although it may be possible to put efficiency 
and effectiveness parameters in place, the placement of 
these parameters may limit the ability of these institutions 
to remain effective and efficient. Even though these 
organizations are capable of providing a valuable service, 
the nature and context of their operations may be 
compromised by placing clear guidelines for their 
assessment. Failure to address these issues may impact the 
effectiveness and efficiency of these organizations making 
any efforts taken to define effectiveness and efficiency in 
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